The history of people--everything that has happened in the past, whether yesterday or thousands of years ago--is a key part of social studies. History is somewhat like a story, but a complicated one. Not only is it the study of past events but also the study of why these events happened. This thought-provoking book will have young historians thinking about the history of their communities and of the wider world. They'll consider causes and effects and make connections with their own (...) lives, both important standards of elementary social studies curricula. (shrink)

Phishing is a fraudulent form of email that solicits personal or financial information from the recipient, such as a password, username, or social security or bank account number. The scammer may use the illicitly obtained information to steal the victim’s money or identity or sell the information to another party. The direct costs of phishing on consumers are exceptionally high and have risen substantially over the past 12 years. Phishing experiments that simulate real world conditions can provide cybersecurity experts with (...) valuable knowledge they can use to develop effective countermeasures and prevent people from being duped by phishing emails. Although these experiments contravene widely accepted informed consent requirements and involve deception, we argue that they can be conducted ethically if risks are minimized, confidentiality and privacy are protected, potential participants have an opportunity to opt out of the research before it begins, and human subjects are debriefed after their participation ends. (shrink)

Peirce trod a fine line between the extremes of nominalism and realism, tough-minded pragmatism and metaphysical speculation. As Peter Skagestad makes clear, Peirce's system of thought was fragmented, incomplete, and sometimes inconsistent.

Reflecting the dangers of irresponsible science and technology, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein quickly became a mythic story that still feels fresh and relevant in the twenty-first century. The unique framework of the Frankenstein myth has permeated the public discourse about science and knowledge, creating various misconceptions around and negative expectations for scientists and for scientific enterprises more generally. Using the Frankenstein myth as an imaginative tool, we interviewed twelve scientists to explore how this science narrative shapes their views and perceptions of (...) science. Our results yielded two main conclusions. First, the Frankenstein myth may help scientists identify popular concerns about their work and offer a framework for constructing a more positive narrative. Second, finding optimistic science narratives may allow scientists to build a better relationship with the public. We argue that by showing the ethical principles and social dimensions of their work, scientists could replace a negative Frankenstein narrative with a more optimistic one. (shrink)

Scientist, mathematician, thinker, the father of pragmatism, the inspiration for William James and John Dewey, Charles Peirce has remained until recently a philosopher's philosopher. Peirce trod a fine line between the extremes of nominalism and realism, tough-minded pragmatism and metaphysical speculation. As Peter Skagestad makes clear, Peirce's system of thought was fragmented, incomplete, and sometimes inconsistent. But one overriding concern gives unity to the whole: the road of inquiry must never be blocked.

The climate of epistemological opinion is rapidly changing in the direction of an increasing concern with the substantive results of the empirical sciences of man, such as psychology and biology. This change is of a comparatively recent date: as late as in 1964, Chauncey Wright’s seminal speculations on the biology of knowledge-processes were shrugged off by one commentator as “nineteenth-century impedimenta and paraphernalia”. Today, such a judgment seems strangely out of date. Our knowledge of man as an animal has been (...) broadened and deepened, both by the dramatic advances of molecular biology and by the recent appearance of the ‘sociobiology’ represented by Edward O. Wilson. To the philosopher, the question inevitably arises of how far this knowledge extends and, in particular, to what extent it can account for peculiarly human intellectual phenomena, such as the growth of scientific knowledge. The study of man as an animal and the study of man as a knower can no longer be simply assumed to be two distinct and separate departments of thought. (shrink)

As one of the best known science narratives about the consequences of creating life, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus is an enduring tale that people know and understand with an almost instinctive familiarity. It has become a myth reflecting people’s ambivalent feelings about emerging science: they are curious about science, but they are also afraid of what science can do to them. In this essay, we argue that the Frankenstein myth has evolved into a stigma attached to scientists (...) that focalizes the public’s as well as the scientific community’s negative reactions towards certain sciences and scientific practices. This stigma produces ambivalent reactions towards scientific artifacts and it leads to negative connotations because it implies that some sciences are dangerous and harmful. We argue that understanding the Frankenstein stigma can empower scientists by helping them revisit their own biases as well as responding effectively to people’s expectations for, and attitudes towards, scientists and scientific artifacts. Debunking the Frankenstein stigma could also allow scientists to reshape their professional identities so they can better show the public what ethical and moral values guide their research enterprises. (shrink)

Among R. G. Collingwood's central ideas were those of history as the re-enactment of past thought and of metaphysics as the analysis of the absolute presuppositions of an era. Both are reflected, though somewhat differently, in the thought and work of Collingwood's one-time student Isaiah Berlin, who explicitly distanced himself from Collingwood's re-enactment doctrine, while himself embracing the somewhat similar, Diltheyan doctrine. By contrast, Berlin accepts Collingwood's doctrine of absolute presuppositions, and his study of the breakdown of the European Enlightenment (...) from internal stresses and strains provides an exemplary illustration of Collingwood's brief account of how absolute presuppositions undergo change. (shrink)

DURING the past decade or so, philosophers of science have increasingly recognized that the rationality and progressiveness of science cannot be fully exhibited in syntactic or semantic terms, i.e., by considering science merely as a system of symbols. The idea is rapidly gaining ground that science is fundamentally a way of dealing with the world around us and that the rationality of scientific method essentially depends on the role which it plays within our total conduct.

Since its first publication in 1818, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus has transcended genres and cultures to become a foundational myth about science and technology across a multitude of media forms and adaptations. Following in the footsteps of the brilliant yet troubled Victor Frankenstein, professionals and practitioners have been debating the scientific ethics of creating life for decades, never before have powerful tools for doing so been so widely available. This paper investigates how engaging with the Frankenstein myth (...) may help scientists gain a more accurate understanding of their own beliefs and opinions about the social and ethical aspects of their profession and their work. The paper presents findings from phenomenological interviews with twelve scientists working on biotechnology, robotics, or artificial intelligence projects. The results suggest that the Frankenstein myth, and the figure of Victor Frankenstein in particular, establishes norms for scientists about what is considered unethical and dangerous in scientific work. The Frankenstein myth both serves as a social and ethical reference for scientists and a mediator between scientists and the society. Grappling with the cultural ubiquity of the Frankenstein myth prepares scientists to face their ethical dilemmas and create a more transparent research agenda. Meanwhile, by focusing on the differences between real scientists and the imaginary figure of Victor Frankenstein, scientists may avoid being labeled as dangerous individuals, and could better conceptualize the potential societal and ethical perceptions and implications of their research. (shrink)

The climate of epistemological opinion is rapidly changing in the direction of an increasing concern with the substantive results of the empirical sciences of man, such as psychology and biology. This change is of a comparatively recent date: as late as in 1964, Chauncey Wright’s seminal speculations on the biology of knowledge-processes were shrugged off by one commentator as “nineteenth-century impedimenta and paraphernalia”. Today, such a judgment seems strangely out of date. Our knowledge of man as an animal has been (...) broadened and deepened, both by the dramatic advances of molecular biology and by the recent appearance of the ‘sociobiology’ represented by Edward O. Wilson. To the philosopher, the question inevitably arises of how far this knowledge extends and, in particular, to what extent it can account for peculiarly human intellectual phenomena, such as the growth of scientific knowledge. The study of man as an animal and the study of man as a knower can no longer be simply assumed to be two distinct and separate departments of thought. (shrink)

This study of Collingwood and his work covers the full range and reach of his philosophical thought. Following Collingwood's education and his Oxford career, Skagestad considers his relationship with prominent Italian philosophers Croce and De Ruggiero and the British idealists. Taking Collingwood's publications in order, he explains under what circumstances they were produced and the reception of his work by his contemporaries and by posterity. Most importantly, Skagestad reveals Collingwood's relevance today, through his concept of barbarism as a (...) perceptive diagnosis of totalitarianism and his prescient warning of the rise populism in the 21st century. (shrink)

The adjective 'virtual,' practically unheard-of a few years ago, has become a primary buzzword of the 90's. Yet the word 'virtual' is nothing new, although its ubiquity is new, as is perhaps its current meaning or meanings. In 1902 the word was defined by Charles Peirce as follows: 'A virtual X is something, not an X, which has the deficiency of an X.' Peirce also references Scotus's concept of virtual knowledge, the concept of virtual velocity in physics, and Edmund Burke's (...) doctrine of virtual representation, which is not representation but is supposedly as good as. The concept of virtuality is deeply embedded in Peirce's doctrine of signs and hence in his semiotic doctrine of mind. In this Peircean doctrine, which has been more recently echoed in the writings of Wittgenstein and Popper, we find the most promising philosophical framework available for the understanding and advancement of the project of augmenting human intellect through the development and use of virtual technologies. (shrink)

The replacement, under totalitarian regimes, of multiple sources of information with a single information monopoly confers an indeterminacy on the concepts of truth, fact, objectivity, and reality. From a pragmatist perspective, these words can then no longer mean exactly what they mean to speakers accustomed to freedom of discussion and inquiry. This corruption of discourse is detailed, e.g., in Arthur Koestler's Darkness at Noon, where criteria for belief?formation are ultimately completely divorced from the objects of belief. Like George Orwell, Koestler (...) postulates a coherent totalitarian perspective, in which the objects of belief are no longer relevant to belief?formation. The present article argues that, once the connection between belief?formation and the object of belief is severed, one can no longer have a coherent body of belief. There is also no evidence that this connection was ever severed in the mind of Koestler's historical protagonist Bukharin, who thus differs from his counterpart Rubashov in Koestler's novel. On the other hand, Koestler's critics are at fault for exaggerating the contrast between Rubashov and the historical Bukharin. The latter's confession at the Moscow Trials can be best understood as a testimony to the epistemically and linguistically corruptive process detailed in Koestler's novel. (shrink)

'Understanding Emotions' presents eight original essays on the emotions from leading contemporary philosophers in North America and the U.K - Simon Blackburn, Bill Brewer, Peter Goldie, Dan Hutto, Adam Morton, Michael Stocker, Barry Smith, and Finn Spicer. Goldie and Spicer's introductory chapter sets out the key themes of the ensuing chapters - surveying contemporary philosophical thinking about the emotions, and raising challenges to a number of prejudices that are sometimes brought to the topic from elsewhere in the philosophy (...) of mind and moral philosophy. Brewer, Hutto, Goldie and Smith explore the conceptual and epistemological problems of other minds that the emotions raise, and how the emotions can be a source of knowledge of the world around us. The chapters by Stocker, Blackburn and Morton are broadly concerned with issues in morality - Stocker argues for the traditional Aristotelian view that emotions reveal value and are constitutive of value; Blackburn, from a more Augustinian perspective, argues that the virtuous person, like the rest of us, will be emotional but he or she will have the right emotions towards the right objects; Morton questions the idea of emotions and narrative as sources of self-understanding. An extensive bibliography completes the book. Drawing together the arguments of leading contemporary philosophers, focusing on issues in the philosophy of mind, epistemology and moral philosophy, this book offers a wide and deep understanding of the emotions, and will be of interest across the philosophical spectrum to students and researchers of this fascinating and important topic. (shrink)

"Wisdom in the Open Air" traces the Norwegian roots of the strain of thinking called "deep ecology" - the search for the solutions to environmental problems by examining the fundamental tenets of our culture. Although Arne Naess coined the term in the 1970s, the insights of deep ecology actually reflect a whole tradition of thought that can be seen in the history of Norwegian culture, from ancient mountain myths to the radical ecoactivism of today. Beginning with an introduction to Norway's (...) emphasis on nature and the wild, Reed and Rothenberg explore the birth of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s. What follows is a collection of writings by prominent Norwegian thinkers on humanity and nature, most never before published in English. From Peter Wessel Zapffe, a twentieth-century Kierkegaardian figure, the list goes on to include Arne Naess, activist/critic/artist Sigmund Kvaloy, wilderness educator Nils Faarlund, novelist Finn Alnaes, sociologist Johan Galtung, and social reformer Erik Dammann. Their points of view offer thoughts on the significance of modern life and what it means to be human in the face of deteriorating environmental global trends of the 20th century. "Wisdom in the Open Air" asks and answers a fundamental question concerning the ecomovement: what is the role of deep, often abstract, thinking in the attempt to avert a very real ecological crisis? (shrink)

In this paper I shall define a thesis I shall call ' determinism ', and argue that it is incompatible with the thesis that we are able to act otherwise than we do. Other theses, some of them very different from what I shall call ' determinism ', have at least an equal right to this name, and, therefore, I do not claim to show that every thesis that could be called ' determinism ' without historical impropriety is incompatible with (...) free will. I shall, however, assume without argument that what I call ' determinism ' is legitimately so called. In Part I, I shall explain what I mean by ' determinism '. In Part II, I shall make some remarks about 'can'. In Part III, I shall argue that free will and determinism are incompatible. In Part IV, I shall examine some possible objections to the argument of Part III. I shall not attempt to establish the truth or falsity of determinism, or the existence or nonexistence of free will. (shrink)

Absolute identity seems at first sight to be presupposed in the branch of formal logic called identity theory. Classical identity theory may be obtained by adjoining a single schema to ordinary quantification theory.

Reprint of paper first published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 1984.

[1] The rise of modern paganism.--v. 2. The science of freedom.

Do we think in natural language? Or is language only for communication? Much recent work in philosophy and cognitive science assumes the latter. In contrast, Peter Carruthers argues that much of human conscious thinking is conducted in the medium of natural language sentences. However, this does not commit him to any sort of Whorfian linguistic relativism, and the view is developed within a framework that is broadly nativist and modularist. His study will be essential reading for all those interested (...) in the nature and significance of natural language, whether they come from philosophy, psychology or linguistics. (shrink)

The historian Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406) is most often treated by historians of philosophy as part of the story of political philosophy in the Islamic world. While this is perfectly legitimate, it may be misleading when it comes to the question of the method he proposes for the historian. This paper argues that that method is in fact based on a different branch of (Aristotelian) science: natural philosophy. After rendering this proposition initially plausible by noting frequent references to "nature" in (...) the _Muqaddima_, the paper discusses a number of parallels between natural philosophy and history as Ibn Khaldūn conceives it. Ultimately it is suggested that this method is legitimated insofar as history is for Ibn Khaldūn a study of human nature. (shrink)